Like most mornings, this one didn't start out much different from the ones before it. Like usual, when my girlfriend leaves for work around 6:30 every morning, I grab my phone and hop online to see if there's been any significant news going on in the world overnight before I fall back asleep for another couple hours.
Only this morning wasn't like all of those other mornings.
Because this morning, instead of seeing some headline about some shooting in Downtown, some holdup gone wrong, some wreck that was snarling traffic for all the morning commuters, what I saw was something which can hurt you in only the way years of devotion to a sports team can: a picture of John Smoltz walking off the field at the Ted (in front of a laughably small crowd) his cap in hand acknowledging the meager standing ovation he was receiving with the headline: "So Long, Smoltz."
It could have been the headline I was expecting -- after a couple months of strenuous rehab, John's arm had once again given out and he was forced to unceremoniously call it a career after yet another unfortunate injury. But, no, that's just what I selfishly wanted it to be.
Back on the 24th of July 1989, I made my first of many pilgrimages to old Fulton County Stadium. Your typical Monday night back in '89, the eventual National League champion San Francisco Giants were in town taking on the Murph and the rest of the lackluster Braves. The 22-year old on the mound for the hometeam had just celebrated his one-year anniversary of his first ML outing the day before and had already ran made a huge impression on the faithful in the 33 starts since his debut against the Mets a year before. For the first time since the man out in rightfield with a #3 on his back burst onto the scene almost a decade prior, Braves fans had something to be excited about.
And, as you're well aware, the kid taking the mound that day was none other than on John Andrew Smoltz.
It was a brilliant outing by Smoltize: a complete game, ten strikeout, three-hitter performance against a team loaded with offense. Unfortunately, the mammoth two-run homer he surrendered to the lethal Kevin Mitchell in the fourth was more than enough for the Reuschel/Brantley/Lefferts/Bedrosian combination the Giants through out, as the Braves weren't able to put a run on the board and lost 2-0.
I guess the thing that sticks out in my mind most about the game in question is the exchange that happened two days later between my father and my seven-year old self. As we drove through town on that Wednesday night, with the Braves and Giants on the radio, closing out their three-game set, Dale Murphy sent a pitch into the left-centerfield seats at the Launching Pad and my dad exclaimed, "see, we could've been there if you kids didn't want to see Smoltz pitch."
I don't know why that statement has always stuck with me, but it's one of those childhood memories that no matter how hard you try to shake it, you just can't.
So, here I sit, almost nineteen and a half years later, trying to shake that and a million other memories of John Smoltz's Hall of Fame career from my head.
As we all know and have heard countless times, Smoltzie was the only player in a Braves uniform from the 106th loss of the 1988 season through the end of the 14 straight division titles in 2006. He was the one on the mound for the 104th loss of the '88 season and a little over three years later, he was the one with Greg Olson in his arms as the Braves celebrated their unbelievable 1991 NL West pennant.
And he was the one who went out in Game Seven of the greatest baseball game of our generation and pitched the game of a lifetime, only to be duped by Chuck Knoblauch and the phantom relay that stopped Lonnie Smith dead in his tracks.
He was the one who stood there, alongside Tom Glavine, Steve Avery and the newly acquired Greg Maddux and was dubbed Atlanta's Young Guns -- a foursome which would finally lead the Braves to the promise land and that one World Series title in 1995.
He was there, along with Chipper in 2005, holding high yet another unlikely division title banner after a new cast of youngsters with names like McCann and Francoeur burst onto the scene and brought a bored fanbase back to life.
And we were there for John when time and time again, injuries began to take their toll on his aging body. From the selfless trip to the bullpen and taking on the closer's role in 2001 -- where he became one of the most elite closers the game has ever seen -- to the unprecedented return to the starting rotation in 2005. From the will-he-or-won't-he talks in the off-seasons after 1996 and 2001 where other teams threw more money at him, but he remained loyal and returned to the only Major League team he's ever known.
But unlike those two previous off-seasons, where Smoltz was willing to take less for a shot at more with the Braves, this off-season just wasn't the same.
As things grow more and more uncertain concerning the future of the Braves franchise, with the post-season drought now sitting at three seasons, the decision to keep reach an agreement became increasingly difficult for the 41-year old and the Braves organization.
For Smoltz, we all know how difficult it has been to sit back and watch the team fumble their way through the winter. Nothing has went right. From the debacle over Jake Peavy, to being outbid repeatedly for a number of free agent pitchers, to the fiasco with Rafael Furcal and the "what just happened here?" agreement, to the only key significant acquisition being a 32-year old starter who cost the Braves two of their most cherished prospects.
For the Braves, it was trying to make the move to start over, only having setback after repeated setback. The dire need for some fresh, young starting pitching. And being unable to get it. The trying to acquire a catalyst for the offense and one more bat for the middle of the lineup. And being unable to get either. To looking down the barrel of an off-season gun where their only major move could be taking a risk on a fan favorite who is coming off reconstructive shoulder surgery and not being ready for action until May or June.
So a decision had to be made. There needed to be a breaking point.
And it doesn't matter what side of the argument you fall on here -- whether you are in support of FireFrankWren.com or feel Smoltz has soldout the franchise like Tommy Glavine did when he left for New York -- the important thing to remember here is what #29 has brought to us all for the past two decades.
Yes, I do feel a little letdown by the front office for not putting forth a stronger effort in bringing Smoltzie back. If only for the mere fact this is going to become a complete public relations disaster for a team who has seen their fanbase become a mere fraction of it was even a decade ago when the city of Atlanta was flourishing and the club had a beautiful new stadium to call home. Things didn't go the way any of us wished last year when the Braves tried to bring Glavine back for one last lap around the track, but we can still all hold our heads high and say he's most likely going out the way he should -- with a tomahawk on his chest.
And, yes, there was also no person more adamant about the age of our pitching staff at the start of last season. I made more than a few concerns with the backbone of the rotation being built around a couple 40-somethings. We all honestly have to start looking towards the future at some point, holding onto the past isn't going to get any more banners put on the facade of the 755 Club at Turner Field anytime soon. But the taste left in my mouth by this is just too much to swallow right now.
As sports fans, we should all have the "whatever is best for the team" mindset. Whether that mindset is directed towards the present or the future, is ultimately up to the holder of said opinion, however. Somethings go above and beyond that, however. As sports fans, we also come to hold the athletes we idolize as something more than just assets to be bought and sold at their peaks and valleys. They become family. They become the familiar face that we can always count on to be there on hot summer nights in August and the cool evenings in October. They are the names and numbers that we wear on our backs -- and in our hearts.
We've said farewell to Greg Maddux and Leo Mazzone. We've done the same to Glavine -- once, and likely to do it again soon. Within the next year, we'll probably say our goodbyes to Bobby Cox, as well. And, eventually, it will be Chipper's turn, too.
They were all there for some, if not most, of this long and winding journey that has lead a city from a team full of perennial losers to the top of the world for almost two decades, but only one of them was there for the full ride.
I want to sit here and say that I'm pulling 100% for Smoltz to get another chance at the Fall Classic with the Red Sox, honestly and truly I do. But I can't. Sometimes, we all gotta be a little selfish -- just like some people say Smoltz is. I wish him nothing but the best and hope he is able to finish out his career on his terms. I also hope he is able to have a healthy 2009 and is able to prove any of the doubters out there wrong.
But I just can't bear to visualize John Smoltz celebrating a World Series victory without the Braves logo on his jersey.
So, good luck, John... Just not that much.
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Deconstructing Jeff Francoeur
Over the past four seasons, there has been no player who has single-handedly caused Braves fans as much mental anguish as Jeff Francoeur. After bursting onto the scene in the summer of 2005, Francoeur has steadily seen his numbers drop -- along with the expectations of fans.
Even as Francoeur has seen his strikeout rate drop and his walk rate rise, the two primary complaints of nearly all of Braves Nation since his call-up, his power numbers have grown progressively worse. So much so, the Braves send him down to Double-A Mississippi in the middle of the 2008 season in hopes of straightening out whatever problems he may have in his mechanics. With his .653 OPS to show for the '08 season, obviously this short stint in the Minors had no positive effect on his levels of production.
So, what has happened with Francoeur over the past three-plus seasons since his initial call-up and torrid tear through the Majors which culminated in his appearances on Sports Illustrated, being dubbed "The Natural"?
Well, there are a number of issues which have contributed to, let's call those Jeff's "Pressure Points"...
BABIP generally has a league average around .300; pBABIP around .310; and BAMC (BABIP, with HR factored in) usually comes in around the .320 mark.
Jeff has been all over in each of these three categories over his career:
As you can see, things were going very good for Jeff in 2005, almost everything he was hitting was finding the right spot on the field and continuing onward once it got there. While this has been the only season of Jeff's career where he has seen his flyballs outnumber his groundballs, he also saw an astounding 18.52% of the groundballs that went for hits go for extra-bases, compared to the usual sub-10% for any other ML hitter. So, 2005 was absolutely a right spot, right time season for Francoeur, in just about every sense of the word.
The next season, he came back down to earth, seeing all three stats at league-average or worse. He did see his percentage of balls put in play rise three percent, thus dropping his strikeout percentage almost the same amount while keeping his walk rate around the same. And while he did see his XBH off grounders come back down to league average-type numbers, he did see a lot more flyballs leaving the park or falling in for doubles, so while his isoSLG did dip from the season before, it still remained above league average.
In 2007 was when things started to go completely haywire. While his averages were all around where they were when he entered the league in 2005, his power numbers had dropped off considerably from the two seasons before. The first indicator of why this was lies in where he was hitting the ball. Jeff was pulling the ball considerably more in '07, be it deliberate or not, he ended up hitting over 30 more balls to the left side than he had the season before. The problem now was Jeff was taking the ball to the left side more than your average hitter and not getting as much jump off the bat because of it. Those flyballs that were once finding the gaps were not ending up being easy outs to the leftfielder and those that weren't became little flairs which were lucky to find some grass. With this, Jeff saw an astounding 23.4% of the fly ball hits go from XBH to mere singles.
And then came 2008, when everything that could go wrong did. Jeff was nowhere near league average in any of the average categories, falling over twenty points below the mean in each. Not only was Jeff not getting any left on anything he hit, but everything he hit was into the ground and right at either SS or 2B. Yet, somehow, his strikeout numbers continued to drop, down almost three percent from his first full season in the Majors -- or the difference in about twenty K's over the course of 700 PA. The problem was, Francoeur was simply hitting a lot of the bad pitches he was missing before. When you're putting the ball in play over 75% of the time and not getting on at least 30% of that, you're doomed to have a historically atrocious season like Jeff had in '08.
And, to those who say the added muscle he put on in the winter between the 2007 and 2008 seasons didn't have an impact, it actually ended in his stats probably being a lot better than they should have been. At least to the tune of helping some of those grounders to reach the outfield and sometimes the gap. While it certainly hurt his intentions -- recall Jeff put on all of the weight in hopes of upping his power numbers from the year before -- it did help him from having an even more catastrophic season than he ended up with.
Alright, so, all of these things seem fairly simple, yes? It just confirms what we all now: Jeff Francoeur just isn't good at hitting a baseball.
So, what does the future hold in store for Jeff if he continues to follow the trends he's currently on? Using all of these tendencies and progressions he's shown thus far, I calculated what his statistics for 2009 may turn out to be:
And what does this show us? Well, the best case scenario is Francoeur remains about a league average hitter. The worst? The Braves are stuck with an outfielder who likely reached his peak during his first 300 ML plate appearances and then let the game catch up with him. The unfortunate thing is, there isn't a GM in baseball who would touch him at this point. Even if the Braves are able to at least get numbers ouf of him that look remotely respectable, they would be left with the situation of dealing him when his stock could potentially be rising, or keeping him in said situation and seeing him return to his old patterns.
Even as Francoeur has seen his strikeout rate drop and his walk rate rise, the two primary complaints of nearly all of Braves Nation since his call-up, his power numbers have grown progressively worse. So much so, the Braves send him down to Double-A Mississippi in the middle of the 2008 season in hopes of straightening out whatever problems he may have in his mechanics. With his .653 OPS to show for the '08 season, obviously this short stint in the Minors had no positive effect on his levels of production.
So, what has happened with Francoeur over the past three-plus seasons since his initial call-up and torrid tear through the Majors which culminated in his appearances on Sports Illustrated, being dubbed "The Natural"?
Well, there are a number of issues which have contributed to, let's call those Jeff's "Pressure Points"...
- The huge descrepency in his BABIP, pBABIP (based on line-drive percentage) and his BAMC (batting average when making contact).
BABIP generally has a league average around .300; pBABIP around .310; and BAMC (BABIP, with HR factored in) usually comes in around the .320 mark.
Jeff has been all over in each of these three categories over his career:
| Year | BABIP | pBABIP | BAMC |
| 2005 | .337 | .274 | .383 |
| 2006 | .284 | .298 | .324 |
| 2007 | .337 | .301 | .362 |
| 2008 | .274 | .287 | .291 |
As you can see, things were going very good for Jeff in 2005, almost everything he was hitting was finding the right spot on the field and continuing onward once it got there. While this has been the only season of Jeff's career where he has seen his flyballs outnumber his groundballs, he also saw an astounding 18.52% of the groundballs that went for hits go for extra-bases, compared to the usual sub-10% for any other ML hitter. So, 2005 was absolutely a right spot, right time season for Francoeur, in just about every sense of the word.
The next season, he came back down to earth, seeing all three stats at league-average or worse. He did see his percentage of balls put in play rise three percent, thus dropping his strikeout percentage almost the same amount while keeping his walk rate around the same. And while he did see his XBH off grounders come back down to league average-type numbers, he did see a lot more flyballs leaving the park or falling in for doubles, so while his isoSLG did dip from the season before, it still remained above league average.
In 2007 was when things started to go completely haywire. While his averages were all around where they were when he entered the league in 2005, his power numbers had dropped off considerably from the two seasons before. The first indicator of why this was lies in where he was hitting the ball. Jeff was pulling the ball considerably more in '07, be it deliberate or not, he ended up hitting over 30 more balls to the left side than he had the season before. The problem now was Jeff was taking the ball to the left side more than your average hitter and not getting as much jump off the bat because of it. Those flyballs that were once finding the gaps were not ending up being easy outs to the leftfielder and those that weren't became little flairs which were lucky to find some grass. With this, Jeff saw an astounding 23.4% of the fly ball hits go from XBH to mere singles.
And then came 2008, when everything that could go wrong did. Jeff was nowhere near league average in any of the average categories, falling over twenty points below the mean in each. Not only was Jeff not getting any left on anything he hit, but everything he hit was into the ground and right at either SS or 2B. Yet, somehow, his strikeout numbers continued to drop, down almost three percent from his first full season in the Majors -- or the difference in about twenty K's over the course of 700 PA. The problem was, Francoeur was simply hitting a lot of the bad pitches he was missing before. When you're putting the ball in play over 75% of the time and not getting on at least 30% of that, you're doomed to have a historically atrocious season like Jeff had in '08.
- The 16% increase in the number of ground balls he's hitting.
And, to those who say the added muscle he put on in the winter between the 2007 and 2008 seasons didn't have an impact, it actually ended in his stats probably being a lot better than they should have been. At least to the tune of helping some of those grounders to reach the outfield and sometimes the gap. While it certainly hurt his intentions -- recall Jeff put on all of the weight in hopes of upping his power numbers from the year before -- it did help him from having an even more catastrophic season than he ended up with.
- The number of two strike counts he finds himself in.
- The fact over 50% of his plate appearances come to an end before he's even seen more than three pitches from the opposing pitcher.
- The huge swing in performance when he finds himself in a 1-2 count, compared to a 2-1 count.
Alright, so, all of these things seem fairly simple, yes? It just confirms what we all now: Jeff Francoeur just isn't good at hitting a baseball.
So, what does the future hold in store for Jeff if he continues to follow the trends he's currently on? Using all of these tendencies and progressions he's shown thus far, I calculated what his statistics for 2009 may turn out to be:
| PA | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS | 2B | HR | K | BB |
| 667 | .258 | .348 | .383 | .731 | 27 | 15 | 105 | 48 |
And what does this show us? Well, the best case scenario is Francoeur remains about a league average hitter. The worst? The Braves are stuck with an outfielder who likely reached his peak during his first 300 ML plate appearances and then let the game catch up with him. The unfortunate thing is, there isn't a GM in baseball who would touch him at this point. Even if the Braves are able to at least get numbers ouf of him that look remotely respectable, they would be left with the situation of dealing him when his stock could potentially be rising, or keeping him in said situation and seeing him return to his old patterns.
Monday, October 27, 2008
Monday, October 20, 2008
Most Profit on Wins in 2008
Just based on a very simple formula based on team payroll, average player salary and number of wins...
Teams with red values obviously spent way too much money for the amount of games they won; teams in italics are ones who turned a profit on wins and also had a record of .500 or better.
| Team | Profit / Win |
| Florida Marlins | $979,445 |
| Washington Nationals | $619,144 |
| Oakland Athletics | $538,247 |
| Tampa Bay Rays | $523,966 |
| Baltimore Orioles | $496,453 |
| Pittsburgh Pirates | $487,473 |
| San Diego Padres | $382,898 |
| Kansas City Royals | $317,073 |
| Texas Rangers | $294,316 |
| Arizona Diamondbacks | $269,914 |
| San Francisco Giants | $202,584 |
| Minnesota Twins | $189,640 |
| Colorado Rockies | $180,682 |
| Milwaukee Brewers | $116,515 |
| Cincinnati Reds | $62,073 |
| St. Louis Cardinals | $40,528 |
| Cleveland Indians | $37,727 |
| Houston Astros | ($43,600) |
| Philadelphia Phillies | ($73,689) |
| Atlanta Braves | ($108,037) |
| Toronto Blue Jays | ($119,841) |
| Los Angeles Angels | ($277,258) |
| Chicago Cubs | ($344,485) |
| Los Angeles Dodgers | ($359,528) |
| Chicago White Sox | ($404,178) |
| Boston Red Sox | ($474,783) |
| New York Mets | ($490,427) |
| Seattle Mariners | ($589,640) |
| Detroit Tigers | ($595,133) |
| New York Yankees | ($1,250,353) |
Teams with red values obviously spent way too much money for the amount of games they won; teams in italics are ones who turned a profit on wins and also had a record of .500 or better.
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Braves SP dERA Analysis
Braves starters and their ERA/dERA difference:
No surprise Jurrjens has been the only one to really live up their own potential and not let the game behind him effect his composure. Also no real surprise Hampton, Reyes and Morton have been hurt so much by the defense behind them because they've been starting in the second half with a horrible defense behind them. The opposite can be said for the positive influence the defense had on the numbers of Hudson, Glavine and Smoltz.
Need proof?
First half ERA/dERA difference: -0.06
Second half ERA/dERA difference: +1.96
Considering the league average difference for starters right now is at +0.24, both of those numbers are almost lying on the extreme ends of the spectrum.
Needless to say, the team is certainly suffering from the loss of Teixeira and the addition of Prado and Infante on a daily basis.
| Pitcher | GS | ERA | dERA | DIFF |
| Jurrjens | 27 | 3.59 | 3.57 | + 0.02 |
| Hudson | 22 | 3.19 | 3.83 | - 0.64 |
| Campillo | 21 | 4.12 | 3.81 | + 0.31 |
| Reyes | 18 | 5.17 | 4.26 | + 0.91 |
| Morton | 15 | 6.32 | 4.89 | + 1.43 |
| Glavine | 13 | 5.54 | 5.99 | - 0.45 |
| Hampton | 8 | 5.67 | 4.64 | + 1.03 |
| James | 7 | 9.10 | 7.60 | + 1.50 |
| Smoltz | 5 | 2.00 | 2.35 | - 0.35 |
| Bennett | 4 | 6.48 | 5.12 | + 1.36 |
No surprise Jurrjens has been the only one to really live up their own potential and not let the game behind him effect his composure. Also no real surprise Hampton, Reyes and Morton have been hurt so much by the defense behind them because they've been starting in the second half with a horrible defense behind them. The opposite can be said for the positive influence the defense had on the numbers of Hudson, Glavine and Smoltz.
Need proof?
First half ERA/dERA difference: -0.06
Second half ERA/dERA difference: +1.96
Considering the league average difference for starters right now is at +0.24, both of those numbers are almost lying on the extreme ends of the spectrum.
Needless to say, the team is certainly suffering from the loss of Teixeira and the addition of Prado and Infante on a daily basis.
Saturday, August 30, 2008
On Mark Kotsay and Joey Devine
(Note: This was all warranted by a thread concerning the Kotsay/Devine trade on Braves-Nation, you can stroll over there and check it out if you want more context.)
Bottomline is this: I was incredibly high on the Kotsay/Devine trade when it went down because I felt it gave the Braves the one piece they were missing to become a legit contender -- a bonafide CF who can play exceptional defense and supply at least leage-average pop. What they gave up was a piece which they already have a surplus of: RH middle relief type pitchers (see: Yates, Acosta, Boyer, Resop, Stockman, Schreiber); along with RH lights out guys like Soriano and Moylan, and two RH swingmen in Bennett and Carlyle. The Braves were absolutely loaded at the time with RH relievers who were more than capable of getting the job done. So trading one of those, any of those, for a crucial piece like Kotsay was a no-brainer. It could have been Resop, Yates, Boyer whoever. The difference in Devine and all the others, however -- outside of Stockman and Schreiber -- was they had at least somewhat proven themself capable of being an asset at the ML level. Devine was simply the odd man out. I'm sure it came down to either Devine or Acosta, and while both are very comparable, the club obviously had more faith in Acosta (see his 21 outings in '07 compared to Joey's ten).
Remember, this is all the mindset of the organization on January 14th, hindsight is completely 20/20.
Did any of us, be it supporters of the trade or the dijectors, see all the injuries which have befalled the starting rotation? The injuries to both Soriano and Moylan? The struggles of Diaz, Francoeur, Escobar and Johnson? The combined 182 starts between Infante, Blanco and Norton? The team being so far out of the race in July they would deal Mark Teixeira for the much inferior Casey Kotchman? Chipper missing a month of action? Kotsay missing almost two months? Julian Taverez, Vladimir Nunez and Elmer Dessens being crucial parts of the bullpen on August 30th?
No, the answer is not a damn one of us saw any of it coming. Even I, one of the biggest doubters of this team coming into the 2008 season, predicted this type of epic collapse.
Sure, sending Devine to Oakland for Kotsay and then turing around and dealing him to Boston before September looks like a total bitch move at this point. Who wouldn't think so? But at the time, the deal was a very logical one which greatly enhanced what was likely going to be an offense which fell below league average; while the bullpen was left with very few questions or concerns.
Devine simply didn't fit into the equation, no matter if you view him as being just a regular RH reliever or the next Jon Papelbon. Trading away expendable pieces for options which are going to greatly enhance another part of your club is what you do, it's how you build a successful team. Granted, you likely don't trade them for one-off thirty-plus options like Kotsay all the time, but given the Braves current outfield depth all around the Minors, this time it made sense. Did it work out? No, but in this grand game, there's never guarantees.
Somewhere down the line, you think the Twins are going to regret trading away Matt Garza for Delmon Young? You bet your sweet ass they are. Hell, they already do. But I'll say now what I said then, it's a move they could afford to make. They had a lot of questions in their outfield with Torii Hunter going to the Angels and needed to add OF depth. Their strong point at the time was having a slew of young, ML ready starting pitchers -- Blackburn, Slowey, Perkins, Baker, Bonser -- not to mention they also still had Santana and Liriano was making great progress. So it made perfect sense to acquire a stud OF prospect in Young for a expendable prospect like Garza. And how have things worked out for the Twins? Well, I'd say being sixteen games over .500, 1.5 games back in their division and 2.5 games back in the Wildcard race is pretty damn good.
Does that mean they wouldn't like to have Garza back? Of course not. But they still have the best young overall core of any staff in baseball. They may not have the best 1-2-3 punch, but they certainly have more depth than any other team out there. Is Young going to turn into a legit star? Right now he's putting up pretty mediocre numbers, but he could always be one AB away from turning the corner and becoming the next Carlos Beltran.
How does all of this tie into the Braves? They could very well be in the situation the Twins are in right now and no one would be kicking themselves to any extreme because Joey Devine is putting up a good season in an incredible Oakland bullpen. Hell, if there is one thing which can be learned from this, it's you can have two pitchers like Devine and Brad Ziegler in your bullpen and still be ten games below .500 and twenty games out of first place.
Relievers are only one player. They're going to be lucky to get into half of your team's ballgames. Unless you do have a player like Mo Rivera, Jon Papelbon, Franky Rodriguez or Joe Nathan to close out games for you, almost every part of your bullpen is going to be interchangable and it isn't going to matter from game to game how a reliever performed the day before, or the day before that.
An everyday player is going to be in the lineup most likely 90% of team games and likely come to the plate 600 times in a season. When your options in center heading into a season are two light-hitting players with little to no ML experience, and your offense is already showing possible signs of struggling, what do you move to try and remedy the situation? Well, if one of the more consistent CF (re: consistent, not star-caliber or most productive) of this generation, you attempt to make a move for them.
Do you trade away a SP? Well, no, the Braves actually had to go out and get Jurrjens and Glavine, so that's out of the question.
Do you trade away a bat? Well, no, if the Braves had enough of those, they wouldn't be in this situation.
Do you trade away one of the key prospects? Absolutely not. I'm all for shipping off unproven prospects, but only if you are getting a player who is going to help out the team in the long-term, not essentially a rental like with Kotsay.
How about the bullpen? Well, we've got a lot of righties, and with the addition of Ohman there is now a core of lefties... What could be the most valuable, yet expendable, piece there? Hrm, Joey Devine has a lot of upside, and we've got a couple arms in Acosta, Resop and Stockman who are comparable, so let's send him to Oakland.
Honestly, how can you possibly doubt the logic involved here?
Bottomline is this: I was incredibly high on the Kotsay/Devine trade when it went down because I felt it gave the Braves the one piece they were missing to become a legit contender -- a bonafide CF who can play exceptional defense and supply at least leage-average pop. What they gave up was a piece which they already have a surplus of: RH middle relief type pitchers (see: Yates, Acosta, Boyer, Resop, Stockman, Schreiber); along with RH lights out guys like Soriano and Moylan, and two RH swingmen in Bennett and Carlyle. The Braves were absolutely loaded at the time with RH relievers who were more than capable of getting the job done. So trading one of those, any of those, for a crucial piece like Kotsay was a no-brainer. It could have been Resop, Yates, Boyer whoever. The difference in Devine and all the others, however -- outside of Stockman and Schreiber -- was they had at least somewhat proven themself capable of being an asset at the ML level. Devine was simply the odd man out. I'm sure it came down to either Devine or Acosta, and while both are very comparable, the club obviously had more faith in Acosta (see his 21 outings in '07 compared to Joey's ten).
Remember, this is all the mindset of the organization on January 14th, hindsight is completely 20/20.
Did any of us, be it supporters of the trade or the dijectors, see all the injuries which have befalled the starting rotation? The injuries to both Soriano and Moylan? The struggles of Diaz, Francoeur, Escobar and Johnson? The combined 182 starts between Infante, Blanco and Norton? The team being so far out of the race in July they would deal Mark Teixeira for the much inferior Casey Kotchman? Chipper missing a month of action? Kotsay missing almost two months? Julian Taverez, Vladimir Nunez and Elmer Dessens being crucial parts of the bullpen on August 30th?
No, the answer is not a damn one of us saw any of it coming. Even I, one of the biggest doubters of this team coming into the 2008 season, predicted this type of epic collapse.
Sure, sending Devine to Oakland for Kotsay and then turing around and dealing him to Boston before September looks like a total bitch move at this point. Who wouldn't think so? But at the time, the deal was a very logical one which greatly enhanced what was likely going to be an offense which fell below league average; while the bullpen was left with very few questions or concerns.
Devine simply didn't fit into the equation, no matter if you view him as being just a regular RH reliever or the next Jon Papelbon. Trading away expendable pieces for options which are going to greatly enhance another part of your club is what you do, it's how you build a successful team. Granted, you likely don't trade them for one-off thirty-plus options like Kotsay all the time, but given the Braves current outfield depth all around the Minors, this time it made sense. Did it work out? No, but in this grand game, there's never guarantees.
Somewhere down the line, you think the Twins are going to regret trading away Matt Garza for Delmon Young? You bet your sweet ass they are. Hell, they already do. But I'll say now what I said then, it's a move they could afford to make. They had a lot of questions in their outfield with Torii Hunter going to the Angels and needed to add OF depth. Their strong point at the time was having a slew of young, ML ready starting pitchers -- Blackburn, Slowey, Perkins, Baker, Bonser -- not to mention they also still had Santana and Liriano was making great progress. So it made perfect sense to acquire a stud OF prospect in Young for a expendable prospect like Garza. And how have things worked out for the Twins? Well, I'd say being sixteen games over .500, 1.5 games back in their division and 2.5 games back in the Wildcard race is pretty damn good.
Does that mean they wouldn't like to have Garza back? Of course not. But they still have the best young overall core of any staff in baseball. They may not have the best 1-2-3 punch, but they certainly have more depth than any other team out there. Is Young going to turn into a legit star? Right now he's putting up pretty mediocre numbers, but he could always be one AB away from turning the corner and becoming the next Carlos Beltran.
How does all of this tie into the Braves? They could very well be in the situation the Twins are in right now and no one would be kicking themselves to any extreme because Joey Devine is putting up a good season in an incredible Oakland bullpen. Hell, if there is one thing which can be learned from this, it's you can have two pitchers like Devine and Brad Ziegler in your bullpen and still be ten games below .500 and twenty games out of first place.
Relievers are only one player. They're going to be lucky to get into half of your team's ballgames. Unless you do have a player like Mo Rivera, Jon Papelbon, Franky Rodriguez or Joe Nathan to close out games for you, almost every part of your bullpen is going to be interchangable and it isn't going to matter from game to game how a reliever performed the day before, or the day before that.
An everyday player is going to be in the lineup most likely 90% of team games and likely come to the plate 600 times in a season. When your options in center heading into a season are two light-hitting players with little to no ML experience, and your offense is already showing possible signs of struggling, what do you move to try and remedy the situation? Well, if one of the more consistent CF (re: consistent, not star-caliber or most productive) of this generation, you attempt to make a move for them.
Do you trade away a SP? Well, no, the Braves actually had to go out and get Jurrjens and Glavine, so that's out of the question.
Do you trade away a bat? Well, no, if the Braves had enough of those, they wouldn't be in this situation.
Do you trade away one of the key prospects? Absolutely not. I'm all for shipping off unproven prospects, but only if you are getting a player who is going to help out the team in the long-term, not essentially a rental like with Kotsay.
How about the bullpen? Well, we've got a lot of righties, and with the addition of Ohman there is now a core of lefties... What could be the most valuable, yet expendable, piece there? Hrm, Joey Devine has a lot of upside, and we've got a couple arms in Acosta, Resop and Stockman who are comparable, so let's send him to Oakland.
Honestly, how can you possibly doubt the logic involved here?
Saturday, August 23, 2008
The Blanco Futility Watch
Yes, my friends, forget the Corky Watch... We've now got the Blanco watch.
And what, exactly, is the Blanco Watch? Well, it has to do with Gregor's lack of extra-base hits.
As you can see from this list, Gregor Blanco is approaching a rather dubious honor: the most PA without reaching twenty extra-base hits. Now, granted, I limited it to post-1990 -- for obvious reasons -- but with a little more playing time, which we all know he'll see, he can possibly reach the coveted top spot.
So, what is it going to take?
Well, right now Blanco has 16 XBH in 454 PA, good for one every 28.375 trips to the plate.
He's averaging 4.37 PA per start (101 starts) and 0.87 PA off the bench (15 games) in the Braves first 130 games. He should end up with around 109 more PA as a starter and around three more off the bench, giving him around 566 PA for the season. And with his 28.375 PA/XBH average, he would end up with right at 19.95 XBH for the season...
Those 566 PA would bump him up into sixth place, past Mike Caruso's 1999 campaign...
Now, I'm sure the top two positions on the list are unobtainable, but will he be able to reach 600 PA? It would only take him 4.57 PA per game, but he'd essentially have to start everyday from here on out. Not only that, but getting the 146 PA would put him slightly over 20 XBH with his current pace.
Can he do it?
And what, exactly, is the Blanco Watch? Well, it has to do with Gregor's lack of extra-base hits.
As you can see from this list, Gregor Blanco is approaching a rather dubious honor: the most PA without reaching twenty extra-base hits. Now, granted, I limited it to post-1990 -- for obvious reasons -- but with a little more playing time, which we all know he'll see, he can possibly reach the coveted top spot.
So, what is it going to take?
Well, right now Blanco has 16 XBH in 454 PA, good for one every 28.375 trips to the plate.
He's averaging 4.37 PA per start (101 starts) and 0.87 PA off the bench (15 games) in the Braves first 130 games. He should end up with around 109 more PA as a starter and around three more off the bench, giving him around 566 PA for the season. And with his 28.375 PA/XBH average, he would end up with right at 19.95 XBH for the season...
Those 566 PA would bump him up into sixth place, past Mike Caruso's 1999 campaign...
Now, I'm sure the top two positions on the list are unobtainable, but will he be able to reach 600 PA? It would only take him 4.57 PA per game, but he'd essentially have to start everyday from here on out. Not only that, but getting the 146 PA would put him slightly over 20 XBH with his current pace.
Can he do it?
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Power Rankings -- 08/10/08
| Rank | Move | Team | W-L |
| (1) | --- | Chicago Cubs | 70-47 |
| (2) | +2 | Tampa Bay Rays | 70-46 |
| (3) | --- | Los Angeles Angels | 73-43 |
| (4) | -2 | Boston Red Sox | 67-50 |
| (5) | --- | Philadelphia Phillies | 63-53 |
| (6) | --- | Milwaukee Brewers | 66-51 |
| (7) | +1 | Minnesota Twins | 65-51 |
| (8) | -1 | Los Angeles Dodgers | 58-58 |
| (9) | --- | New York Mets | 62-54 |
| (10) | --- | New York Yankees | 63-54 |
| (11) | +3 | St. Louis Cardinals | 65-54 |
| (12) | +3 | Florida Marlins | 61-56 |
| (13) | -1 | Arizona Diamondbacks | 59-58 |
| (14) | -3 | Chicago White Sox | 64-51 |
| (15) | +3 | Texas Rangers | 60-58 |
| (16) | -3 | Detroit Tigers | 57-59 |
| (17) | -1 | San Francisco Giants | 49-66 |
| (18) | +1 | Oakland Athletics | 54-62 |
| (19) | +4 | Pittsburgh Pirates | 53-63 |
| (20) | -3 | Cincinnati Reds | 52-66 |
| (21) | --- | Houston Astros | 57-59 |
| (22) | +2 | Toronto Blue Jays | 59-58 |
| (23) | -1 | Atlanta Braves | 55-62 |
| (24) | +1 | Kansas City Royals | 53-64 |
| (25) | -5 | Baltimore Orioles | 56-59 |
| (26) | --- | Colorado Rockies | 53-66 |
| (27) | --- | Cleveland Indians | 51-64 |
| (28) | --- | San Diego Padres | 45-72 |
| (29) | --- | Washington Nationals | 44-73 |
| (30) | --- | Seattle Mariners | 45-72 |
Difference in Team ERA and Team DERA
So, for those of you who are unaware of what dERA (Defense-Independent ERA), here's a brief definition from Wikipedia:
And my point here today is to differentiate between those teams which have most benefited from their defense (ie: have a negative difference between ERA and dERA) and those who have been most hurt. In a round-a-bout way, it's determining who has the best defense without taking into consideration hollow stats like fielding percentage, errors and such.
Onto the numbers...
Defense-Independent ERA (dERA), created by Voros McCracken, projects what a pitcher's earned run average (ERA) would have been, if not for the effects of defense and luck on the actual games in which he pitched.I think that's pretty point blank. Just go show you which variables are used to determine it, they are: batters faced, home runs allowed, total walks allowed, intentional walks allowed, strikeouts and hit batsmen.
And my point here today is to differentiate between those teams which have most benefited from their defense (ie: have a negative difference between ERA and dERA) and those who have been most hurt. In a round-a-bout way, it's determining who has the best defense without taking into consideration hollow stats like fielding percentage, errors and such.
Onto the numbers...
Most Helped by Defense
Most Hurt by Defense
| Rank | Team | ERA | dERA | DIFF |
| (1) | Phillies | 3.93 | 4.26 | - 0.33 |
| (2) | Athletics | 3.73 | 3.96 | - 0.26 |
| (3) | Angels | 3.88 | 4.09 | - 0.21 |
| (4) | Rays | 3.77 | 3.95 | - 0.18 |
| (5) | Cubs | 3.82 | 4.00 | - 0.18 |
| (6) | Brewers | 4.00 | 4.16 | - 0.16 |
| (7) | Red Sox | 3.77 | 3.91 | - 0.14 |
| (8) | Orioles | 4.67 | 4.80 | - 0.13 |
| (9) | Cardinals | 4.24 | 4.36 | -0.12 |
| (10) | Mets | 4.07 | 4.16 | - 0.09 |
| (11) | Blue Jays | 3.67 | 3.73 | - 0.06 |
Most Hurt by Defense
| Rank | Team | ERA | dERA | DIFF |
| (1) | Rockies | 4.82 | 4.19 | + 0.63 |
| (2) | Rangers | 5.31 | 4.74 | + 0.57 |
| (3) | Royals | 4.62 | 4.05 | + 0.57 |
| (4) | Pirates | 5.18 | 4.69 | + 0.49 |
| (5) | Yankees | 4.27 | 3.84 | + 0.43 |
| (6) | Reds | 4.58 | 4.23 | + 0.35 |
| (7) | Diamondbacks | 3.99 | 3.64 | + 0.35 |
| (8) | Giants | 4.27 | 3.97 | + 0.30 |
| (9) | Mariners | 4.42 | 4.13 | + 0.29 |
| (10) | Padres | 4.32 | 4.05 | + 0.27 |
| (11) | Twins | 4.33 | 4.11 | + 0.22 |
| (12) | Indians | 4.40 | 4.20 | + 0.20 |
| (13) | White Sox | 3.99 | 3.82 | + 0.17 |
| (14) | Marlins | 4.52 | 4.36 | + 0.16 |
| (15) | Dodgers | 3.66 | 3.57 | + 0.09 |
| (16) | Nationals | 4.42 | 4.34 | + 0.08 |
| (17) | Astros | 4.58 | 4.55 | + 0.03 |
| (18) | Tigers | 4.52 | 4.50 | + 0.02 |
| (19) | Braves | 4.06 | 4.05 | + 0.01 |
Thursday, August 7, 2008
Waiver Wire Primer
Ok, so, there is (and always will be) mass confusion over how the waiver period works between July 31 and August 31, so I thought I'd try and help shed a little light on what actually happens during that time.
First, the basic: Any player can be put on waivers, and most are. Teams can put up to seven players on waivers each day, and by the first few weeks, most teams have put their entire 40-man roster on the waiver wire.
Why?
After the trade deadline passes on July 31st, any player a team wishes to trade who is currently on their 40-man roster has to pass through revocable waivers in order to be dealt to another team.
Example: If the Braves wish to trade Will Ohman to another team, he first has to be placed on waivers. If a team places a claim on him, the Braves have 48 hours to work out a deal with the club in question. If no team claims him, the Braves can then trade him to any club at any point over the next 30 days.
Now, how does the process work once a player is placed onto waivers?
First, each team in the league the player's team is in has right to make the first claim. Priority is based on a worst-to-first ranking. So, using the above example, if both the Astros and Phillies claimed Ohman, the Houston would be the winners, because of their having a worse record of the teams making the claim.
If a player passes through their own league without a claim being made, then the opposing league then has a chance to claim the player. So, in order for a team like the Red Sox to claim a National League player, they must first clear waivers in the NL. However, the same worst-to-first priority also works in the opposite league, as well. So, in order for Boston to claim an NL player, the eleven teams with a worse record must also pass.
So, what happens once a player has been claimed?
Ok, here's where it can get a little more confusing.
There are three different options: (a) the original team can revoke the player, (b) try to work out a trade with the team who made the claim or (c) send the player to the team who made the claim with that team accepting all financial burdens tied to the player in question.
Option A: Since the type of waivers we are referring to here are revocable waivers, the team who has placed a player on waivers can pull them back at any point if a team makes a claim. Nothing changes, the player remains on the original team and the team who made the claim has no stake or ties to the player they placed a claim on. The one drawback of this is, a player can only be placed on revocable waivers once. If a team pulls a claimed player back before the 48 hour window closes, they cannot be placed back on waivers within the current season. If they attempt to do so, it will be on irrevocable waivers and the player will be free to go to which ever team makes a claim.
Option B: If a team makes a claim on a player, the original team is free to attempt to work out a deal with that club for the player. The hitch is, any players who are dealt for the original player, must either pass (or have passed) through waivers themselves or not be on the claiming team's 40 man roster. Once it reaches this point, trades work just like they normally would, but with that one small issue.
Option C: If a player is placed on waivers and claimed, the original team has the right to allow the claiming team to acquire the player while accepting their existing contract, play the original team a waiver fee and have to place the player on their active roster. This is the main reason you never see players like Chipper, Manny, Pedro or whoever else has a massive contract claimed -- at any point the original team could pull an "ok, take him, he's yours" and the claiming team would be forced to bite the bullet and take the player. This has happened a number of times, most notably in 2000 when the Devil Rays placed Jose Canseco on waivers, had the Yankees claim him and Tampa freeing themselves of the $3M burden and giving him to New York.
Alright, now, what if a player passes through the three day waiver period without a claim being made? At that point, it becomes similar to option B above. The player is free to be traded to any other ML team, but like with option B, any player acquired for them has to either have passed through waivers or not be on the 40 man roster.
One last note: The blocking of a player. A number of years ago, the Expos had placed Pedro Martinez on waivers and were trying to work out a deal with another team to acquire him. The problem was, before the other team could make the claim on Pedro, another team lower in the standings made a claim on him with no other intentions than to keep him from going to their division rival. That team made the claim, had no intentions of acquiring him, the Expos weren't just going to hand him over, so the 48 hour window passed and Pedro was taken off the waiver wire.
The problem with this is, and could very well be the case with the Red Sox and Padres right now over Brian Giles, what if the waiving team says to take the player? Boston obviously had no interest or desire to acquire Giles when they made the claim to block Tampa from getting him, but now that supposed trade talks have opened up between the two teams, you have to wonder if San Diego may have wanted to turn Giles over to Boston. And if Boston would have been stuck with Giles, perhaps that is what lead to the two clubs opening up trade discussions, mainly for the Pads to also be able to get something for Giles instead of just sending him on his merry way to New England.
One last thing: As I'm sure almost everyone knows by now, in order for a player to qualify to be on a postseason roster, they have to be in an organization by 5pm on August 31st. Any player acquired after that point will not be eligible to play in the postseason.
Alright, are we clear now?
If you have any additional questions, feel free to ask and I'll attempt to answer with the best of my ability.
First, the basic: Any player can be put on waivers, and most are. Teams can put up to seven players on waivers each day, and by the first few weeks, most teams have put their entire 40-man roster on the waiver wire.
Why?
After the trade deadline passes on July 31st, any player a team wishes to trade who is currently on their 40-man roster has to pass through revocable waivers in order to be dealt to another team.
Example: If the Braves wish to trade Will Ohman to another team, he first has to be placed on waivers. If a team places a claim on him, the Braves have 48 hours to work out a deal with the club in question. If no team claims him, the Braves can then trade him to any club at any point over the next 30 days.
Now, how does the process work once a player is placed onto waivers?
First, each team in the league the player's team is in has right to make the first claim. Priority is based on a worst-to-first ranking. So, using the above example, if both the Astros and Phillies claimed Ohman, the Houston would be the winners, because of their having a worse record of the teams making the claim.
If a player passes through their own league without a claim being made, then the opposing league then has a chance to claim the player. So, in order for a team like the Red Sox to claim a National League player, they must first clear waivers in the NL. However, the same worst-to-first priority also works in the opposite league, as well. So, in order for Boston to claim an NL player, the eleven teams with a worse record must also pass.
So, what happens once a player has been claimed?
Ok, here's where it can get a little more confusing.
There are three different options: (a) the original team can revoke the player, (b) try to work out a trade with the team who made the claim or (c) send the player to the team who made the claim with that team accepting all financial burdens tied to the player in question.
Option A: Since the type of waivers we are referring to here are revocable waivers, the team who has placed a player on waivers can pull them back at any point if a team makes a claim. Nothing changes, the player remains on the original team and the team who made the claim has no stake or ties to the player they placed a claim on. The one drawback of this is, a player can only be placed on revocable waivers once. If a team pulls a claimed player back before the 48 hour window closes, they cannot be placed back on waivers within the current season. If they attempt to do so, it will be on irrevocable waivers and the player will be free to go to which ever team makes a claim.
Option B: If a team makes a claim on a player, the original team is free to attempt to work out a deal with that club for the player. The hitch is, any players who are dealt for the original player, must either pass (or have passed) through waivers themselves or not be on the claiming team's 40 man roster. Once it reaches this point, trades work just like they normally would, but with that one small issue.
Option C: If a player is placed on waivers and claimed, the original team has the right to allow the claiming team to acquire the player while accepting their existing contract, play the original team a waiver fee and have to place the player on their active roster. This is the main reason you never see players like Chipper, Manny, Pedro or whoever else has a massive contract claimed -- at any point the original team could pull an "ok, take him, he's yours" and the claiming team would be forced to bite the bullet and take the player. This has happened a number of times, most notably in 2000 when the Devil Rays placed Jose Canseco on waivers, had the Yankees claim him and Tampa freeing themselves of the $3M burden and giving him to New York.
Alright, now, what if a player passes through the three day waiver period without a claim being made? At that point, it becomes similar to option B above. The player is free to be traded to any other ML team, but like with option B, any player acquired for them has to either have passed through waivers or not be on the 40 man roster.
One last note: The blocking of a player. A number of years ago, the Expos had placed Pedro Martinez on waivers and were trying to work out a deal with another team to acquire him. The problem was, before the other team could make the claim on Pedro, another team lower in the standings made a claim on him with no other intentions than to keep him from going to their division rival. That team made the claim, had no intentions of acquiring him, the Expos weren't just going to hand him over, so the 48 hour window passed and Pedro was taken off the waiver wire.
The problem with this is, and could very well be the case with the Red Sox and Padres right now over Brian Giles, what if the waiving team says to take the player? Boston obviously had no interest or desire to acquire Giles when they made the claim to block Tampa from getting him, but now that supposed trade talks have opened up between the two teams, you have to wonder if San Diego may have wanted to turn Giles over to Boston. And if Boston would have been stuck with Giles, perhaps that is what lead to the two clubs opening up trade discussions, mainly for the Pads to also be able to get something for Giles instead of just sending him on his merry way to New England.
One last thing: As I'm sure almost everyone knows by now, in order for a player to qualify to be on a postseason roster, they have to be in an organization by 5pm on August 31st. Any player acquired after that point will not be eligible to play in the postseason.
Alright, are we clear now?
If you have any additional questions, feel free to ask and I'll attempt to answer with the best of my ability.
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